Network caches are the storage centers in the supply chain for content delivery-the digital equivalent of warehouses. Operated by access networks and other operators, they provide benefits to content publishers in the forms of bandwidth cost reduction, response time improvement, and handling of flash crowds. Yet, caching has not been fully embraced by publishers, because its use can interfere with site personalization strategies and/or collection of visitor information for business intelligence purposes. While recent work has focused on technological solutions to these issues, this paper provides the first study of the managerial issues related to the design and provisioning of incentive-compatible caching services. Starting with a single class of caching service, we find conditions under which the profit-maximizing cache operator should offer the service for free. This occurs when the access networks' bandwidth costs are high and a large fraction of content publishers value personalization and business intelligence. Some publishers will still opt out of the service, i.e., cache bust, as observed in practice. We next derive the conditions under which the profit-maximizing cache operator should provision two vertically differentiated service classes, namely, premium and best effort. Interestingly, caching service differentiation is different from traditional vertical differentiation models, in that the premium and best-effort market segments do not abut. Thus, optimal prices for the two service classes can be set independently and cannibalization does not occur. It is possible for the cache operator to continue to offer the best-effort service for free while charging for the premium service. Furthermore, consumers are better off because more content is cached and delivered faster to them. Finally, we find that declining bandwidth costs will put negative pressure on cache operator profits, unless consumer adoption of broadband connectivity and the availability of multimedia content provide the necessary increase in traffic volume for the caches.
Introduction
e-business is a large and growing part of overall commerce conducted today 1 . The growth of content and applications on the Internet has been phenomenal and is likely to continue. These observations highlight the importance of Internet infrastructure as a key enabler of e-business.
The infrastructure consists of the following players intermediating between the end user and the content publisher:
1. Internet Access Providers (IAPs) such as AOL and Earthlink that provide retail-level
Internet access to end users.
2. Local Area Transport (LAT) service providers such as local phone companies and cable franchises that connect end users' premises to the IAPs' Points of Presence (POPs).
3. Backbone Networks such as AT&T and UUNET that operate long-haul data networks and provide wholesale-level Internet access to IAPs. Backbone networks interconnect with one another through Network Access Points (NAPs) and bi-lateral peering points to form the Internet backbone.
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) such as Akamai and Digital Island (now part of
Cable & Wireless) that deliver content on behalf of content publishers using proprietary networks of caching servers. Each of these players in the Internet value chain plays a distinct role. The networks are involved in providing transport services. They help move the content, created by content publishers, over the Internet. Caches are the storage centers -the digital equivalent of warehouses. In this context, the Internet infrastructure makes up the digital supply chain for information goods. The content publisher creates the content, networks help move the content and the caches store and deliver it to the users. Our study focuses on caching because of the rapidly occurring transformation of these content storage and distribution centers and the critical impact that these changes will have on the digital supply chain and therefore to e-business. This is underscored in IDC's projection that the caching market would be worth $4.5 billion in 2004.
A web cache can be conceptualized as an intermediary that stores local copies of web content between the origin server and the client in order to satisfy future requests for the same. If there is another request for the cached content (a web page), the local copy may be returned instead of requesting the origin server for it again. Cache performance is measured by its hit-rate, which denotes the fraction of requests satisfied by the cache. Caching makes use of the locality in web request patterns (i.e., a recently requested data object is likely to be requested again in the near future). By moving content to the edge of the network, caches help reduce latency for the end user and bandwidth costs for the IAP. A recent survey of caching from a management science perspective is provided by Datta et al. (2002a) .
Caching can be implemented at various locations in the network. For example, browser caches permit re-use on the client desktop alone. Proxy caches permit caching of data objects in gateways of large organizations or IAPs. Because proxy caches are located at points of aggregation, they are shared by a large number of users and hence demonstrate higher hit rates.
Thus, they are very effective in reducing latency and traffic. Vendors such as Inktomi and Cisco develop solutions that IAPs may use to deploy proxy caches on their servers.
In addition, CDNs provide solutions that allow content publishers to store data objects at geographically dispersed servers and direct a client to an appropriate server in order to reduce latency and bandwidth costs and evenly distribute server load. These servers are located at the edge of the Internet (typically collocated with partnering IAPs around the world) and thus provide similar benefits as proxy caches at IAP locations. While many of the arguments presented in this paper apply to CDNs as well, the focus of this paper is on caching at IAP locations. A brief discussion on the extension to the CDN setting is provided in the concluding section.
We can quantify, in dollar terms, the magnitude of bandwidth savings that can be realized by an IAP from caching. AOL serves 13.5 billion URLs to its users every day (AOL 2002).
Vendors specify proxy caches to be capable of delivering hit rates between 35-75% (WebCaching.com 2002). Assuming a hit rate of 40% and a conservative size of 100 KB for the response to an average web request, this amounts to an average of 16.2 petabytes of data every month that AOL serves from its cache and hence need not fetch over the network. However this demand for content would not be spread evenly in a 24-hour period. Assuming that the bulk of the data is demanded in a 6-hour time frame, i.e., a conservative peak-to-average ratio of 4:1, AOL saves 64.8 petabytes per month or a little over 200 Gbps of bandwidth. This can be serviced by eighty OC 48 connections (a single OC 48 connection can handle up to 2.488 Gbps).
Even with today's reduced bandwidth costs, this amounts to savings of about $430 million per annum. These savings are AOL savings alone and do not account for consumer surplus from faster downloads due to caching or content publishers' bandwidth and infrastructure savings from not having to serve the content from their servers.
Proxy caches at IAP locations help the network operators (IAPs) realize bandwidth savings for themselves and latency reduction for the end users. They are therefore beneficiaries of these services. However, content publishers also derive significant benefits. Caches are crucial to content publishers in:
1.
Handling flash crowds: Flash crowd is the term used to refer to sudden surges in demand for content that can bring servers down and render web sites unreachable. Caches help in alleviating the problem by meeting a large fraction of the demand using locally stored content.
2.
Improving content delivery/response time: Response Time is a key determinant of consumer switching behavior on the web. According to Jupiter Research, nearly half of the web users have stopped using a preferred web site due to poor performance. By improving response time, caches can thus increase customer retention rates for web sites.
3.
Reducing bandwidth costs: Caching also reduces bandwidth costs for content publishers, as they do not have to deliver any data for requests satisfied from the cache.
4.
Reducing infrastructure costs and scaling content delivery globally.
Currently, content publishers do not pay for IAP caching services. Despite these seemingly large benefits to content publishers, they often choose to mark their content as noncacheable . This practice, also known as cache busting, results in slower response times for end users and increased costs for IAPs and the publishers themselves. The primary reason why publishers cache-bust is that caching results in a loss of business intelligence regarding visitors to websites. Accuracy of access reports and click-stream data is crucial to various firms for marketing and internal auditing. Caching can result in a loss of accuracy of access statistics because the origin server may not be informed whenever cached content is served. Furthermore, a variety of e -marketing techniques rely on personalization through cookies. Jupiter Research reported that 40% of Fortune 500 companies had migrated to dynamic data driven personalized content as early as 1998. Traditional caching approaches have impeded personalization due to the possibility of content created for one user being displayed to another.
Support for dynamic content caching in IAP caches has been minimal. Furthermore, some publishers cache bust due to concerns relating to stale content being served to the end user. This occurs whenever changes in content at the origin server are not reflected at the cache. In addition, caching may potentially create new security concerns (violation of confidentiality, integrity or authentication). For example, several publishers with confidential data such as medical records cache-bust due to security concerns arising from confidential data residing in a foreign location that is not under their immediate control.
Thus, there is a need to devise ways to reap the benefits of caching without incurring the costs of today's "Best Effort" caching that precipitates cache-busting. These can be addressed by provisioning premium services that ensure comprehensive reporting, object consistency, security, etc. In addition, technologies such as differential caching, push caching, dynamic content caching, etc. further enable publishers to derive tangible benefits from caching services.
However, provisioning these features is in general expensive for an IAP (Maggs 2002; Stargate 2002 ). These services would therefore need to be priced to provide the IAP with the right incentives to provision them. Much of the work done to date on Quality of Service (QoS) in caching has focused on the technology and has not dealt with issues of fundamental importance to the business of provisioning caching services -specifically, the design of incentive compatible services, appropriate pricing schemes and associated resource allocation issues that arise in operating a caching service. This is the focus of the paper. The paper is organized as followswe state the research question and summarize key results in section 1.1. We review the related literature and present our integrated QoS framework in section 2. Section 3 presents the results of our empirical analysis of trace data. In section 4, we develop an analytical model for pricing and resource allocation. In section 5, we relax a number of assumptions and test the robustness of our results. We conclude the paper in section 6 with a summary of our findings and directions for future research.
Research Question and Key Results
As noted above, adoption rates for caching has been declining because content publishers have generated new requirements over the last few years. Through analytical models, we hope to inform caching service design and provide insights into optimal pricing and capacity allocation policies.
The primary contribution of the paper is to provide prescriptions to cache operators for design of incentive compatible caching services and help prevent the cache-busting that is rampant today. Our research suggests that the design of such incentive compatible QoS-based services can significantly improve market welfare. However, only large IAPs would be able to provide such services due to the role of transaction costs and economies of scale and scope.
Smaller IAPs will need to partner with an intermediary to provide such services. CDNs can play an important role in facilitating such markets, particularly for small IAPs. The models also provide valuable insights on the future of the caching and content delivery market. For example, we find that resources will be increasingly directed towards premium services in the future.
Further, declining bandwidth costs will have a significant nega tive impact on profits from caching services.
QoS Framework and Literature Review
Publisher-centric caching has generated significant interest recently (Myers et Various techniques can be used to implement QoS caching. Object placement policy refers to the policy used to determine when data objects move into a cache. Traditional placement policies entail an object being moved into the cache only when a request is made for it. Push caching and pre-fetching allow a publisher's objects to be moved into the cache even before a request is made for it. Thus, a publisher can enter into agreements with a cache operator that enables her objects to be moved into the cache in anticipation of future requests.
Since caches have a finite size, an object may have to be purged from the cache when a new object is moved in. The decision of which data object to replace is governed by the replacement policy. Replacement policies such as Least Recently Used (LRU) or Least
Frequently Used (LFU) are commonly used to replace objects. The primary goal of replacement policies is to maximize the hit rate of the cache. LRU replaces objects that were least recently requested (assuming that they are also least likely to be requested again) and LFU replaces objects that were accessed least frequently.
Object replacement policies may also be modified to include differential treatment to data objects through differential caching techniques such as cache reservation and priority caches.
Cache reservation involves reservation of a predetermined space in the cache for objects from a specific publisher. Alternatively, priority caches may be employed to increase the lifetime of the premium objects. Priority caches allow the assignment of priorities to different classes of content and provide high priority data objects with higher hit rates. Thus, the manner in which the IAP chooses to allocate the available cache space between the different service classes determines the QoS experienced, with regard to hit rates. Chan et al. (1999) propose a market mechanism for a replacement policy in which content publishers bid for space in a cache.
Current Best Effort caches maintain consistency by the use of expiration headers that specify the expiration time or Time To Live (TTL) of the document. However, data sources may be modified before the TTL expires resulting in stale content being served. These problems can be circumvented by the use of invalidation schemes wherein the server sends invalidation messages (Yu et al. 1999 ) to the cache whenever content changes or by using leases (Yin et al. 1998 ). The cache operator can additionally provide reports on access patterns to publishers (Mogul and Leach 1997) . Furthermore, caches can add support to dynamically generated data and streaming data. The Dynamic Content Caching Protocol -DCCP (Smith et al. 1999 ) allows applications to specify the caching policies for the dynamic content generated by them. Datta et al. (2002b) also propose an approach to cache dynamic content at a proxy. 
Cache Pricing and Resource Allocation -Unique Challenges
While there are previous studies on pricing of priority services (Marchand 1974;  Mendelson and Whang 1990; Rao and Peterson 1998), the domain of web caching poses unique challenges. Firstly, the subscribers of the caching service (content publishers) are not the generators of demand. The publishers subscribe to the service but the end users, who do not directly participate in the subscription, generate the demand (number of requests and hence objects served from the cache). In addition, the service provider -the IAP -also derives a positive utility from the caching service (bandwidth cost reduction). That provides the IAP with incentives to provide discounts. Thus, there is a strong interaction between the service provider's surplus and the subscriber's (content publisher) surplus. Furthermore, pricing and resource allocation are strongly coupled in the domain of web caching. The price that the IAP can charge depends partially on how high a hit rate it can provision for the service classes, which is determined by the allocation decision. The optimal allocation decision depends on the traffic profile in the various service classes, which is in turn determined by the pricing.
The analytical model in this paper is related to the models in (Mussa and Rosen 1978) , (Bhargava et al 2000) and (Maskin and Riley 1984) . Mussa and Rosen (1978) consider the pricing of a product line by a monopoly, with buyers purchasing one good. Bhargava et al.
(2000) study pricing strategies for intermediaries in electronic markets. Maskin and Riley (1984) study optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market with asymmetric information.
Sundararajan (2002) studies optimal pricing of information goods when both fixed fee and usage-based pricing are feasible. Dewan et al. (2000) study the relationship between proprietary content providers and IAPs in distribution channels for information goods on the Internet. As mentioned above, cache QoS pricing is a problem different in structure and scope.
QoS pricing has also been addressed in detail in the transmission domain (Gupta et al. 1997 ; Cocchi et al. 1993 ). In the transmission domain, as in caching, pricing and resource allocation are strongly coupled. However, the resource allocation problems are quite different. In transmission, the router's queue management and scheduling operations provide the performance differentiation for data packets arriving in real time. Queue management controls the length of the packet queues and hence determines which data packets may be dropped when buffer overflow occurs. The scheduling policy determines which packet to send next and hence controls bandwidth allocation. Hence, a constrained buffer and bandwidth are allocated in real time. The real time nature also implies that the pricing has to be coarser than packet level pricing as it would be too costly to implement in real time. On the other hand, the resource allocation problem in caching relates to the allocation of the available cache space between the service classes. The IAP has to account for the fact that its allocation decision also impacts its own bandwidth savings (the allocation decision may lower the overall hit rate and hence increase the IAP's bandwidth costs). Data objects stay in a cache for at least a few hours, even for "onetimer" objects that get purged soon. Hence more elaborate QoS mechanisms, such as those specified in figure 2 , can be justified. Additionally, this also allows for object level pricing. In contrast, even per-flow QoS (intserv) is deemed non-scalable in transmission and the focus has more recently been on per-class QoS (diffserv).
The performance objectives of QoS in caching and transmission are dissimilar as well. In transmission, the goal is to reduce delay, jitter and/or packet loss for performance-sensitive applications. To achieve end-to-end QoS, it is necessary to provide network operators with incentives to ensure appropriate service levels to users from different subscriber bases. Thus, Gupta et al. (1997) and Cocchi et al. (1993) consider a pricing policy that maximizes collective benefits of the system rather than the network operator's profits. In caching, the QoS goal is to provide higher hit rates for objects that value caching more, provide security, etc. Resources need not be allocated along the path as in transmission. Allocation at the caching node alone suffices and this makes QoS caching easier to realize. Pricing provides a means to align the incentives of IAPs and publishers and thus achieve the QoS goals. Finally, in contrast to network QoS pricing, the IAP would choose prices that maximize its profit rather than social welfare. All these aspects make cache QoS pricing and resource allocation a unique and challenging problem.
Trace Analysis
Before we proceed to the analytical model for pricing and capacity allocation, we start with an empirical analysis of web traces in order to better understand the problem and calibrate some of the parameters for the model. In order to price the service, the IAP should be aware of the distribution of requests for content. For example, can we assume that requests are uniformly distributed or normally distributed across data objects? This is important because a publisher's valuation of caching an object depends on the number of requests for that object. If the object is requested 10,000 times, it may be valuable to cache this object as opposed to one that is requested 3 times. The distribution of requests for the population of data objects thus determines the price that the IAP can charge. In addition, we also need to determine whether and how differential allocation of cache space alters the benefit from caching. That is, how does the hit rate (fraction of requests served from the cache) increase with cache size? For example, is it acceptable to assume that hit rate increases linearly with cache size? Furthermore, is the increase in hit rate different for popular content versus relatively unpopular data objects? The answers to these questions will play an important role in determining the IAP 's pricing strategy.
To answer these questions, we study two publicly available web proxy traces from the 
Pdf of Requests, R
The number of requests for an object is denoted by R. We study traces to determine f(R), the probability density function (pdf) of R. Although R is a discrete variable, we shall use a continuous approximation in the derivation below and the rest of the paper. , where Ω and δ are constants. However, the distribution of requests has not been studied. Based on the zipf relationship, we can however analytically derive an approximate functional form for f(R).
If f(R) denotes the pdf of R, then the rank of an object that is requested R times can be approximated as
, where N is the total number of objects and R UB is the upper bound of the number of requests for an object (may be infinity). The expression assumes that all objects have unique number of requests and is hence an approximation. We also know from the zipf-like relationship that Table 2 . The fit for both the traces is good.
For the purposes of the analytical model to follow, we need only note that requests follow a power law distribution. We shall later examine the implications of this distribution on our results. Table 2 . Estimates of parameters for the distribution of R
Cache Hit rate
Hit Rate denotes the fraction of requests answered by the cache. For instance, if the cache satisfies three out of every six requests, it is said to have a hit rate of 50%. Clearly, a larger cache has a higher hit rate because it can store a large r number of data objects. Therefore H(S), the hit rate for a cache of size S, increases monotonically with S. In order to estimate the impact of cache size, we simulated a cache using the WisWeb cache simulator (Cao and Irani, 1997). The simulator simulates requests using a trace as an input and provides information on the hit rates for different cache sizes. We simulate an LRU caching policy, the most popularly used cache replacement policy. We consider cache sizes of 50% (a cache size big enough to store all objects in the sample is 100%), 20%, 10%, 5% and 0.5%. We test the following model for the two
. We find that the logarithmic specification fits well for both traces. The results are also consistent with earlier literature such as 
Estimates from regression of H(S) on ln(S)

Object Specific Hit rate
The object specific hit rate, H(S,R), is the hit rate of an object with R requests in a cache of size S. This denotes the fraction of requests for that object that were satisfied by the cache.
The previous sub-section estimated how the overall hit rate may vary with cache allocation.
While the IAP cares about the overall hit rate, the content publisher is only concerned about the object specific hit rates for her objects. Clearly, H(S,R) increases with cache size S but also varies with the object popularity R. The more popular an object, greater the likelihood of it being requested before it is replaced from the cache. Therefore, it enjoys a higher hit rate too. Thus H(S,R) also increases monotonically with R. We model the object specific hit rate as follows:
. In addition to noting the hit rates for the cache as a whole, we also recorded the hit rates for each data object in the trace-driven cache simulations. The parameter estimates are presented in table 4 . Other specifications such as
= also perform well. However, we use the chosen specification because of the common use of the logarithmic specification in modeling hit rates in the caching literature ). We conclude our empirical analysis with a summary of the findings. We found that distribution of requests follows a power law, specifically a pareto distribution. We found that increasing the cache size for any service class increases the hit rate in a concave manner, with a logarithmic relationship. The hit rate experienced by different objects varies across objects, with popular objects enjoying a higher hit rate. We use these observations in the analytical model that follows. 
We summarize here the key results from the empirical analysis:
1. Distribution of Requests for content: The pdf of the number of requests for data objects is given by
2. Hit Rate for Cache: The hit rate of a cache varies as the logarithm of its size, S when an LRU replacement policy is used i.e., )
3. Object Specific Hit rate: The hit rate experienced by an individual data object varies as the logarithm of the cache size and as the logarithm of the number of requests for the object. Thus, popular objects are intrinsically more likely to be served from the cache (for an LRU policy).
Analytical Model
The unit of analysis in the analytical model presented in this section is an object. That is,
we assume that the content publisher makes the caching decision by data object. This reflects the real world situation very well. Publishers' decisions regarding the content they mark as cacheable vary from one data object to another. Further, the publisher may care about security for a data object that contains confidential data but may not place a similar weight on quality (security, consistency, etc) on another object. Thus, it makes sense to model caching decisions by object, as valuations for different data objects may be different, even for the same publisher.
We consider a monopoly pricing model in this paper. This is because u sers typically subscribe to particular IAPs and cannot switch IAPs instantaneously. Therefore, the IAP has monopolistic power over pub lisher's access to users. This arises from it being the only conduit to any particular set of end users. A different IAP can only provide access to a different set of users and hence cannot be treated as a perfect substitute. In addition, large IAPs such as AOL have considerable market share that enables them to provide significant value to the publishers that is hard to replace.
In the resource allocation section, we assume that a cache is already in place and the cache size, S, is therefore a fixed exogenous parameter. That is, we do not consider determination of the cache size in our model. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the issue of optimal cache sizing has been considered in detail by Kelly and Reeves (2000) . Secondly, we focus on the problem of an IAP, with a cache in place, making the decision of provisioning a premium service (QoS cache). Therefore, in our setting, the IAP needs to determine how to allocate the available space to the different services. Table 5 Glossary of terms
We begin this section with an analysis of IAP caching services as they are provisioned today. As explained in section 1, IAPs maintain a best effort cache without any support for security, business intelligence and other value-added features. We explore why IAPs do not price the service, why cache-busting occurs, and study the potential loss in social welfare. In section
4.2, we analyze the equilibrium when a premium service is introduced by the IAP.
Single Best-effort Service
The content publisher has content (data objects) that is requested by an end user and the IAP is the conduit through which the content is delivered. Due to its unique position in content delivery, the IAP can provide the publisher with additional value through caching (the IAP derives some benefits too, namely bandwidth savings). We separate the value derived by the publisher from the caching service into two components -benefits derived from caching and costs incurred due to caching. The former represents benefits directly associated with caching (such as bandwidth savings and benefit from faster delivery of content). These benefits are derived every time an object is served from the cache (called a "hit"). The latter represents costs incurred due to the compromise of value added features such as personalization of content, security, reporting, etc.
The cost to the publisher of compromising on security and other value-added features is denoted by )
. θ is a type parameter that denotes the weight that the publisher attaches to value-added features for the specific object. This weight would clearly vary from publisher to publisher and even from object to object for a given publisher. For example, a data object containing confidential information may be associated with a high θ whereas another not requiring security, reporting, etc. may correspond to an extremely low θ . We assume that θ is uniformly distributed in [0,1] across objects. We shall soon discuss the implications of this assumption. ( L q − ) denotes the level of quality of the value-added features, with the negative sign indicating the "lack of quality" or the fact that costs are being incurred due to loss of security, personalization, etc.
The publisher derives a benefit from being able to deliver his content faster to the end users (consumers of content). This benefit captures increased customer retention rates from faster delivery of content. For every object delivered from the cache, η represents the aforementioned benefit to the publisher. Another important component of the benefit from caching is the bandwidth savings realized by the publisher. B denotes the average bandwidth cost of processing
, where Thc or "Total hit count" is the count of the number of times the object is served from the cache. If R denotes the number of requests for an object and
The benefit function captures the tradeoff faced by the publisher -caching provides certain benefits related to bandwidth savings and faster content delivery but imposes costs too.
We assume that the IAP charges a price P for every object served from this best-effort cache. Thus, the net surplus to the publisher derived from caching an object of type θ and
. The publisher's decision problem is to choose whether to cache or opt out (cache bust). The publisher decides to cache if 0 ≥ L U and will cache-bust otherwise. To determine the number of subscribers to the service, we consider a publisher with an object of type i θ who is indifferent between caching and not caching (gets zero surplus from the caching service). By setting
. Note that i θ varies with R as shown in figure 4. Any publisher with an object with ) (R i θ θ > is more sensitive to value-added features and hence will not cache. Those with lower θ s will cache because they incur lower costs from caching but derive the same benefits as the indifferent publisher. This is also illustrated in the figure. To compute the IAP's expected profit, we first determine the expected number of requests for objects that are cached by summing up the number of requests for all objects with i θ θ ≤ (see figure 4 ). This is denoted by R L . Out of these R L requests for objects,
as hits (delivered from cache). The IAP's expected profit is thus given by:
For each object served from the cache, the IAP charges a price P. In addition, the IAP realizes bandwidth savings, B IAP , from avoiding a request to the upstream backbone provider.
Finally, the IAP incurs a marginal cost of metering and billing denoted by T. This represents costs associated with m onitoring its caches, collection, customer support costs and additional accounting. For simplicity, we assume that these costs are linear in usage. If the IAP does not price the service, it incurs no such cost (i.e., T=0 whenever P=0). We sum up all requests for objects with i θ θ ≤ and plug it into the profit function to get:
Based on the first order condition, the optimal price that the IAP should charge is 
. Thus, the number of subscribers to the caching service decreases as the transaction cost, T, increases. This is illustrated below. Figure 5 . Impact of transaction costs on prices and subscriptions When ) (
, there will be no publisher willing to pay for the caching services. At some transaction cost well below this level, the IAP would be better off setting the price to zero (transaction cost of billing, T would also be 0) and maximizing its bandwidth
. It would be optimal for the IAP to set the price to zero if ) ( ) 0 (
, the optimal price for the IAP is P * =0. One possible explanation for the fact that today's best effort service is free is that T is close to the above threshold. That is, the transaction cost of metering and billing may be high compared to the benefits that each player derives. Furthermore, the price is low if the IAP bandwidth costs are high.
To consider the impact of distributio nal assumptions, we solved the same model but introduced a skew in the distribution of object types:
Relative to a flat distribution, this distribution assumes that there are a relatively higher number of publishers who care about value-added features than those who do not (see figure 6 ). in reality is that IAP bandwidth c osts are reasonably high and publisher preferences are negatively skewed with a large number of publishers being sensitive to value-added features.
Even when prices are zero, several publishers will cache-bust because the cost of caching
) dominates the benefits for these publishers. where the price in the case of the uniform distribution is zero but non zero for the skewed distribution. However, the IAP bandwidth cost is so high under these settings that it turns out that the price for the skewed distribution is negative (the IAP pays publishers to induce them to cache). Thus, the impact of the skew is to reduce the price regardless.
rates for caching will likely continue to decline. In the ne xt section, we explore how the equilibrium changes when an additional premium caching service is also provided by the IAP.
Provisioning of Premium Service
In this section, we assume that the IAP provisions a premium service in addition to the best effort service. The premium service offers a higher quality level to the publishers. This higher quality is achieved by supporting dynamic content (personalization), object consistency, security, business intelligence, etc., and by providing premium objects with higher hit rates.
Support for value-added features eliminates the cost incurred by the publisher due to caching.
By using an appropriate priority scheme, the IAP can provide premium content with a higher hit rate. For example, Kelly et al. (1999) propose a scheme where different objects are assigned different weights and a server-weighted replacement policy is used to provide higher hit rates to objects with higher weights. of our model, it does not matter which scheme is used to achieve differential hit rates. Our model prescribes the optimal effective cache sizes (or equivalently, optimal hit rates for the two content classes). Any of these schemes may be used by the IAP to achieve the differential hit rates. In the rest of the paper, the terms cache size or cache space will refer to the effective cache size/space without any reference to the underlying priority scheme.
Content Publisher's Decision Problem
We assume that the IAP offers two services -a Best Effort service and a premium service. The IAP charges a price L P for every object served from its best-effort cache 3 . The IAP offers a service at a higher quality level and charges a per-object price H P . We denote the level of value-added features for the premium service by H q . The positive sign on the quality indicates a benefit to the publisher. This is because the IAP can provide the publisher with superior business intelligence than the publisher can gather on her own. For example, the IAP can provide valuable information about end users (type of Internet connection, user profile, etc) or aggregate information across publishers. The publisher's benefit function has the same form as in the previous section. Thus, the publisher's net surplus from the two services is given by:
where
As discussed previously, any priority scheme for differential caching can be expressed using different effective cache sizes for the two services. The cache space, S, is divided into 2 levels, with α denoting the fraction of cache space allocated to the best effort service. That is, S α is the size of the cache for best effort subscribers and the remainder of size (1-α )S is for the premium subscribers. To determine the number of subscribers to the service, we consider a publisher with object of type L θ who is indifferent between the Best Effort service and not subscribing to the service at all (gets zero surplus from the Best Effort service). Any publisher
is more sensitive to value-added features and hence will not choose the best effort service to cache the object. Those objects associated with lower θ will cache in the best effort service. Similarly, we consider a publisher with an object of type H θ who is indifferent between the premium service and not caching (gets zero surplus from the premium services). Objects associated with H θ θ > gain more benefits from the premium service and will be cached. 
Both L θ and H θ vary with demand R and are thus curves that represent indifferent content publishers. We call these the "Quality Indifference Curves" (QICs) for the publishers 4 . A sample QIC, based on assumed prices and quality levels is shown in figure 7 . The interesting 4 "Quality Indifference Curves" are not the same as indifference curves in economics. Traditional indifference curves denote how consumers trade-off one good for another (thus indicating the Marginal Rate of Substitution). QICs denote the points in space where publishers are indifferent between services. They are usually called indifference points in microeconomic models. Since these points vary with R, we refer to them as QICs.
. Publishers in this region care enough about security, business intelligence, etc. that they will not choose the best-effort service but not so much that they are willing to pay the premium price. Note also that in figure 7 , publishers subscribe to the service which provides them with the maximum surplus, an Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint. Additionally, the publishers will cache a data object only if the surplus from doing so is positive, which is an Individual Rationality (IR) constraint. Figure 7 . Sample Indifference points (for assumed price and quality levels)
Properties of the Quality Indifference Curves (QICs)
This section presents some properties and observations regarding the QICs.
"Well-behaved" curves: One important property that we desire from the QICs is that they never cross each other. If they do, then interpreting the QICs becomes difficult.
Lemma 1:
The Quality Indifference Curves never cross each other.
Lemma 2:
If the IAP prices optimally, then
The proofs for both lemmas are provided i n the appendix. We will use these lemmas in lemma 3 and in computing IAP profit functions in the next section.
Segmentation Conditions
The market is segmented if there are customers for both the services. There exist subscribers to the best effort service only if L θ >0 for some R. Similarly, there exist subscribers to the premium service only if H θ <1 for some R (see figure 7 ). These two conditions are thus necessary conditions for segmentation. 
Equation (4) indicates that if the price is above the specified threshold, no publisher will choose the premium service.
, then there will be no subscriber for the best effort service. This condition can be rewritten as
. This condition sets a simple upper bound for the price that the IAP can charge for the best effort service.
Lemma 3:
If the IAP chooses prices and allocation policy so that
, then the market will be segmented.
The proof is provided in the appendix. It is clear from the discussion above that these two conditions are necessary. Their sufficiency is established in the appendix. Note that the optimal prices need not satisfy these conditions. Thus, whether it is optimal to segment the market depends on whether the optimal prices satisfy the conditions of lemma 3.
IAP's Decision Problem
Illustrative Example: Consider a discrete example where the population consists of 4 objects } , , , { o subscribe to the best-effort service and 4 o opts out. Thus, the subscription to the services is given by the 2-tuple (1,2) indicating that 1 object subscribed to the premium service and 2 objects to the best-effort service. However, the IAP's profit depends not on the subscription per se, but on how these objects contribute to the incoming request. The incoming request vector is given by the 2-tuple (5,4), indicating that 5 requests per unit time are for objects subscribed to the premium cache and 4 for objects subscribed to the best-effort cache. The IAPs profit is given 5 By "feasible" subscriber, we mean a subscriber in the feasible region with θ ∈ The IAP has a cache of size S. It allocates the space to the two services through its choice of α (fraction of space allocated to the best effort service). In addition, the IAP also chooses the prices for the two services. As indicated in lemma 2, the IAP will not find it desirable to choose prices that sets the H θ QIC below the L θ QIC. Hence, we only discuss the case
To compute the IAP's profit function, we first determine the expected number of requests for objects in the premium service by summing up the requests for all objects with H θ θ > (see figure 5 ). This is denoted by R H . Similarly, the expected number of requests for "best-effort objects", R L , is obtained by summing up requests for objects of type L θ θ ≤ . The IAP's expected profit is given by: There is a fixed cost for the IAP to provision the value added services. This is the cost of the infrastructure the IAP needs in order to provide security, business intelligence, etc. The cost is C(q H ), which is monotonically increasing in q H .
As discussed previously, R is randomly distributed across objects and has a pdf given by the pareto distribution. The hit rate is given by
. R H is obtained by summing all the requests for objects in the topmost region of figure 7 . R L is obtained by summing up all requests in the lowermost region. That is,
θ . This gives us:
where k 1 is a constant of integration (see Appendix A2 for full derivation of expected profit). The
. Following the traditional approach (for example, Neven and Thisse 1990) in pricing, we model the IAP's problem as a two-stage process. In the first stage, we look at the pricing problem assuming that the allocation problem has been solved.
That is, we address the pricing problem assuming that α is an exogenous parameter that has already been determined and hence the IAP is only interested in pricing. In the second stage, we analyze the allocation problem (determining optimal α ). Note that this procedure maps well to reality where pricing follows production or service design.
Pricing Problem
As discussed above, we assume that α is an exogenous parameter and focus on the pricing problem in this section. The first order conditions associated with the problem are as follows:
The first term in the derivative indicates the increase in revenue from being able to charge an infinitesimal amount more for the premium service. The second term captures the decrease in revenue from subscribers opting out of the premium service due to this small increase in price.
The interpretation is similar. The first term reflects the increased revenue from being able to charge more from the best-effort customers. However, some subscribers opt out of the service due to the increased price (second term). The interpretation of the first-order conditions and trade-offs associated with pricing is summarized in Table 6 .
Impact on Premium Service
Impact on Best-Effort Service Table 6 . Impact of decision variables on profit
Solving the two first-order conditions gives us:
, the optimal prices are:
, the optimal price for the best effort service is P L * =0
and P H remains the same.
It can be verified that the Hessian is negative definite implying that the prices in equation 6 represent a maxima. Substituting the optimal prices from lemma 4 into the segmentation conditions of lemma 3, the following proposition is immediate.
, then it is not optimal for the IAP to segment the market.
If transaction costs of metering and billing are exceedingly high, then a market for premium services may also fail. However, if the premium service provides a very high level of support for value-added features ( q H is high), a market for premium service will exist.
Improvements in Information technology (IT) can help facilitate increase in q H as has been
witnessed in the last several years in caching technologies. In addition, IT can play an important role in reducing the transaction cost of metering and billing and help facilitate such markets for premium web caching services.
The Quality Indifference Curves associated with the optimal prices of equation (6) are:
Special Case
Note that the first order conditions in section 4.2.4 display no cannibalization effects. Hence, the optimization of P L and P H is done independently. Thus, this process may artificially push the H θ QIC below the L θ QIC (and may incorrectly count the subscribers in the intermediate region twice -once as subscribers of the best effort service and once of the premium service). When this occurs, the optimal prices are at a boundary condition where
. Note that this special case represents the case where the market is completely captured (all publishers cache either in best effort or premium service). This special case is not very realistic and thus we focus only on the interior solution in the rest of this paper.
Comparative Statics
Based on the QICs in equation 7, we can cond uct sensitivity analysis to determine how various parameters impact the subscriptions to the services. For example, how would subscriptions to a service change if technology facilitates improvements in the quality of valueadded features. Improvements in quality will increase publisher surplus. The IAP can extract the additional value by increasing prices. However, the net impact on subscriptions depends on whether the price increases outpace increase in surplus for the indifferent publishers.
Proposition 2:
If the quality of the best effort service is increased and the IAP reacts optimally with respect to prices, subscription to the best effort service increases and to the premium service is unchanged.
Proof: From equation (7), it follows that an decrease in L q (note that an increase in quality corresponds to a decrease in L q ) causes L θ to increase and H θ is not affected. This implies that the number of subscribers to the best effort service increases and that to the premium service is unchanged. When
, the best effort service is free (P L * =0).
Substituting this into equation 2, we again find that L θ increases with quality. Thus, subscription to best effort service increases with quality, irrespective of the transaction costs.
Proposition 3:
If the quality of the premium service is increased and the IAP reacts optimally, subscription to the best effort service is not affected but to the premium service decreases, is unchanged or increases depending on whether T is less than, equal to or greater than
Proof: From equation (7), it follows that an increase in H q has no effect on L θ . Thus, the number of subscribers to the best effort service is not affected. The impact on the premium service is readily verified for three cases.
There are two aspects worth noting in the propositions. First, there exist no cannibalization effects. That is, changes in quality of one service do not impact the other, unlike traditional vertical differentiation models. This is because of the negative quality of the low quality service that results in the no-subscription region being sandwiched between the premium and best-effort subscribers (see figure 7) . Thus, changes in parameters of any service affects that service but the other service is shielded from experiencing any impact. In contrast, there are direct effects to other services from changing any service parameter in classical segmentation models. In addition, we observe that the direction of the impact of increasing quality is different for the services. For the low quality service, increase in quality consistently results in an increase in subscribers. This is because the IAP is unable to increase its price as the benefit from quality is still negative (i.e. 0 < ⋅ − L q θ ). Thus, publisher surplus increases, resulting in an increase in the subscription base. On the other hand, price increases with quality for the premium service.
Whether the price increase outpaces the benefit from quality increase for the indifferent publishe r at H θ depends on the relative magnitude of transaction costs compared to the hit-based benefits. The IAP may lose subscribers but earn higher margins per subscriber with low transaction costs. Note that proposition 3 is consistent with proposition 1. If ) (
the quality of the premium service will have to be considerably high for the service to exist .
Proposition 4:
As bandwidth costs decrease, subscriptions to both the services decrease.
Proof: As bandwidth costs drop, both B and B IAP decrease in equation (7). This causes H θ to increase and therefore subscription to the premium service drops. Simultaneously, L θ decreases implying that subscription to best effort service decreases. Table 7 . Impact of quality and bandwidth on Subscription Equation (6) 
, where C is a normalization constant, results in the following nonlinear optimal price:
Space constraints prevent us from providing a detailed derivation. Interested readers may contact the authors. There also exists some non-linearity with regard to impact of cache sizes. Equation (6) indicates that the per-object price for the premium service decreases with increasing cache size. This is analogous to quantity discounts in conventional pricing theory. The total price charged to a publisher for caching an object is
, which is increasing in cache size.
Space Allocation
In the previous section, we looked at the pricing problem assuming that the cache sizes
were exogenously decided. Space allocation is however a real-world problem faced by cache operators. Typically caches sizes are optimized based on traffic profiles and are never over-provisioned. This is due to diminishing returns from increasing cache sizes and costs dominating beyond the optimal cache size (Kelly and Reeves 2000). The cost of incremental upgrades at various caching nodes tends to be high, hence they are rarely resized unless the traffic profile changes substantially ( Maggs 2002 ). Thus, caches are a capacitated resource and space allocation is an important consideration. As stated earlier, our model prescribes the optimal effective cache sizes for the two services. An appropriate priority scheme may be used to implement the same.
We obtain the first order condition of the expected profit with respect to α , conditional on the prices. The equation is of the form
(see Appendix A3). The equation does not yield a closed form solution, although the existence can be guaranteed by Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem (Brouwer 1910 ). The proof is based on the
. Thus, the optimal allocation of cache space is given by the solution to ) (
The detailed proof is presented in the appendix. To illustrate how the IAP may solve the allocation problem, we consider a numerical example below.
Illustrative Example
We simulate values for the various parameters in the model. We consider an average publisher with bandwidth cost of 0.03c per object. This corresponds to a publisher with a T1 connection priced at $750 per month, an average object of size 50 KB and a peak to average bandwidth ratio of 4:1. The IAP handles more traffic and hence would have lower bandwidth costs. Assuming that the IAP uses an OC-48 connection, this gives us IAP bandwidth cost of 0.011c per object. Thus, the IAP bandwidth cost is approximately 36% that of the typical publisher. We assume that the publisher's benefit from faster delivery of content is of the same order of magnitude as bandwidth savings, i.e., = η 0.03c. While appropriate values for L q and H q can be best calibrated from surveys of content publishers, one can calibrate these parameters by intuitively considering q ⋅ θ as the dollar cost/benefit of value-added features (note that
is the dollar value of bandwidth savings). The publisher who is most sensitive to non-hit rate attributes such as security, consistency, reporting, etc ( 1 = θ ) is assumed to value these features an order of magnitude more than the bandwidth savings ( 
Bandwidth Costs Fraction of Space
Optimal Allocation Figure 9 . Impact of decreasing bandwidth costs on allocation One interesting question that arises from recent trends is how do decreasing bandwidth costs impact the allocation decision and profit. We repeat the simulations but halve the bandwidth costs for both the IAP and the content publisher (B = 0.015c and B IAP = 0.0055c).
Under the new settings, it is optimal for the IAP to allocate 10.9% of the cache to the lower level. reduce the size of the best effort cache and increase the size of the premium cache as bandwidth costs decrease.
We find that the IAP's profit also decreases when bandwidth costs fall 6 . In figure 10 , the upper curve shows the change in IAP's profits (the data is calibrated to B oeing trace) as bandwidth costs decrease. The lower curve plots the IAP's profits if it does not pursue any QoS caching policies. This is the current scenario wherein an IAP's surplus from caching consists only of its bandwidth savings. It must be noted that these simulations do not account for other possible trends that might accompany reduction in bandwidth costs. For example, the reduction in costs might reduce access charges for end users causing a greater demand for content (both the type of content requested and number of requests may change). Also, there may be accompanying changes in response times causing changes inη (publisher's benefit from faster delivery of content). It is difficult to ascertain the exact nature or magnitud e of these changes.
However, it is possible to determine the rate at which traffic will need to go up in order to maintain IAP profits at the same level. Figure 11 indicates how the total volume of traffic will need to rise for our trace (Boeing) in order for the IAP profits from QoS caching to remain constant despite declining bandwidth costs. The sub-linear relationship (note also that the x axis is on a log scale) indicates that such an increase may be feasible. 
Robustness of Model
We conclude our discussion of the model with a review of our modeling assumptions and the robustness of our analytical insights. In the model, we account for heterogeneity among objects in terms of demand but ignore size related differences. That is, we assumed that all objects have the same size. However, accounting for size related heterogeneity adds an additional dimension to the QICs without providing greater insight. While heterogeneity in object sizes impact the efficiency of caching algorithms and policies, they did not seem to critically affect the pricing strategies (especially since the pricing is usage based). By ignoring size differences, the model thus ignores heterogeneity in bandwidth cost B and benefit from faster delivery of content η . Accounting for bandwidth costs and speedup benefits for an average data object enables us to keep the model tractable and derive valuable broader insights.
Bandwidth is currently priced using either a usage based model or capacity-based model. The model assumed that θ is uniformly distributed across data objects. The broader insights of the model did not change for other well-known distributions. The net impact of a negative skew was to reduce the price that the IAP can charge. The model also assumed that the publisher surplus from value-added features, q, was linear in q. Introducing non-linearity in preferences also introduces non-linearity in pricing, as indicated in section 4.2. In section 5.1, we revisit our model and consider correlation between benefit from value-added features and number of requests for an object. In section 5.2, we discuss the sensitivity of the results to trace parameters and finally discuss the implications of publishers' contracting costs in 5.3.
Correlation between benefits from value -added features and demand, R
The publisher's benefit function in section 4 assumed that the benefit/cost from valueadded features is independent of the number of requests for an object. The two may in fact be correlated. That is, the publisher may value security or business intelligence more for an object that is in relatively higher demand. Hence, we consider two variants of the publisher surplus function. The first is:
. This surplus function is similar to the one in section 4. It assumes that each object has an intrinsic requirement (or lack thereof) for value-added features. This is denoted by θ . For example, a publisher with an object with confidential data always values security more for this object than another without sensitive information (all else held constant). However, this function also assumes that the importance of value-added features increases with popularity of an object. Given two objects with the same θ , the publisher values the premium service higher for the relatively popular object. The imp act of the change is that the slopes of both the QICs in figure 5 decrease. The optimal prices are given by:
. The per-object price charged to the best effort service is not affected and that to the premium service changes (we will soon show that it decreases). Broader insights from the model continue to hold.
Next, we let the benefit/cost from the value-added features increase at a faster rate with R than the hit-rate benefits by assuming:
Note that this model is also similar to the model in section 4 except that it assumes that the benefit/cost from value-added features increases as the square of R. We had previously defined q H as the dollar benefit from the value-added features to the most sensitive publisher. From that definition, it follows that
transformations ensure consistency across the two models so tha t we can continue to infer each term in the surplus function as a dollar cost or benefit. In this new specification, as in the preceding case, the slopes of the 2 QICs decrease. However, the impact is strong enough to cause
the QICs to slope downwards as illustrated in the figure below. Downward sloping QICs imply that more popular objects prefer the premium service. Figure 12 . Sample QICs for new model (assumed price and quality levels)
The functional form of the optimal prices do not change, with
. Thus, the price of the premium service decreases from that in section 4. The broader insights from the model in section 4 (such as propositions 1-3, impact on profit and allocation, etc) are not altered. We can expect reality to lie between the cases of complete independence (figure 5) and strong correlation (figure 12). Thus, the net impact of assuming a correlation between number of requests and benefit from value-added features is that slope of the QICs and the magnitude of price for premium service may change. Both the variants considered in this sub-section suggest that the broader insights from the model in section 4 do not change with correlation assumptions.
Sensitivity to Trace Parameters
The results from the numerical analysis in section 4.3.1 are based on parameters obtained from the trace analysis (specifically Boeing trace). In this section, we highlight the sensitivity of the results to the trace parameters. We first highlight the results of the trace analysis -The pdf of the number of requests for data objects is given by 
Since various studies ) have shown that requests-rank relationship for requests follows a zipf distribution, our calibrated distribution (pareto) is likely to hold. What may vary from one trace to another is the parameter β and the upper bound on the number of requests, R UB (c is a function of β and R UB ). Traces that are favorable for caching are those with low β and high R UB . These traces have a relatively higher number of popular objects and popular objects tend to be extremely popular (see figure 13) . We consider the impact of trace parameters on the results by considering two traces, which we shall call regular (high β , low R UB ) and When the rela tive density of popular objects increases, the IAP has incentives to provide more resources to publishers of such objects. Figure 7 indicates that for a given value of θ , popular objects are more likely to be in the best effort service. The IAP thus allocates a larger fraction of the cache space to the best effort service to ensure that a large fraction of the data objects continue to be cached. This reduces the surplus for premium objects and thus it reduces P H to compensate for the same.
In contrast, when the benefit function is as in equation 8, the indifference points are as shown in figure 12 . Popular objects are more likely to be in the premium service because surplus from value-added features increases with R at a faster rate than hit rate benefits. When the relative density of popular objects increases, the IAP caters to the ir publishers by increasing the fraction of space allocated to the premium service. Since the surplus of the publishers increases, the IAP is able to charge higher per-object prices as well. Thus, the impact on the allocation and price depends on how popularity of data objects impacts the trade-off between hit rate benefits and value-added benefits. The bottom line is that sensitivity to value-added features will have to increase at a very high rate with R (faster than R R ln ⋅ ) for prices and cache size of premium service to increase, else we expect both to decrease when relative density of popular objects increases.
In the cache simulations, we found that that hit rate varies as the logarithm of the cache size with an LRU replacement policy. This drives the result that the total price charged increases as the logarithm of the cache size for any service level (or per object price decreases as the inverse logarithm of cache size). The concavity of hit rate Vs. cache size is expected to hold for other replacement policies and thus total price is expected to increase non-linearly (concavely) with cache size irrespective of the replacement policy.
Contracting Costs for Content Publishers
The model presented in section 4 incorporates transaction costs of contracting for the IAP but not for the publisher. The model incorporating publisher transaction costs is relatively tedious and hence we only highlight the key insights from the model here. Including a transaction cost of contracting for publishers reduces their surplus from the service. The net result is that publishers only have incentives to contract with large IAPs. IAPs with large subscriber bases would handle a large number of requests for the publisher's content and thus benefits from the service can outweigh the contracting costs. On the other hand, smaller IAPs will find it difficult to attract publishers because the contracting costs may outweigh the publisher's benefit from the service. 
Conclusions
Quality of Service (QoS) is the leading performance consideration in e-business today.
We introduce a framework t o structure and analyze the QoS issues in web caching in an integrated manner. If designed prudently, QoS caching would move content delivery almost entirely to the edge. This could change the structure of the digital supply chain and have significant impact on e -business infrastructure. For example, it could move "intelligent"
processing of collateral information -of great interest to e-marketing -to the edge of the network as well. When combined with our conceptual view of content delivery as a digital supply chain for information goods, this suggests that content publishers would gradually become "manufacturers" of content and caches would handle the storage and "retailing" of content. This is a significant reinvention of content delivery, as it exists today.
There exists no previous research in the area of cache QoS pricing and capacity allocation. While IAPs currently deploy caches, they do not charge publishers for these services because of the best effort nature of these services. Best effort caching worked well as a caching paradigm a few years back. As electronic markets have matured over the last couple of years, publishers have developed new requirements (such as personalization, business intelligence) which current caching services do not meet. The best effort nature of caching is thus contributing to significant cache-busting by publishers. Our paper proposes a QoS framework wherein an IAP can provision value-added services to respond to the new needs of publishers and thus realize more efficient markets. QoS-based caching can help prevent a lot of the cache-busting that is prevalent today. In addition to increasing publisher welfare, appropriate pricing of these services can ensure that IAPs are also better off. Thus, this aligns the incentives of publishers and IAPs and increases overall market welfare. We have introduced a framework to determine optimal pricing strategies for an IAP provisioning best effort and premium caching services. We also address the capacity allocation issues that arise from the provisioning of these services.
We find that value-added services would allow cache operators to price discriminate effectively. Additionally, we find that subscriptions to both the services would drop with falling bandwidth costs. This effect can be mitigated by either provisioning superior value-added services or through increased broadband penetration. The former allows the IAP to charge higher prices. Increased broadband penetration would likely increase Internet usage by end users as well as the volume of traffic on the Internet, thus reinforcing the value of caching and increasing adoption. For example, consider the fact that @Home (a broadband ISP now part of Comcast) had 0.3% of Internet subscribers but constituted 5% of Internet traffic.
Our analysis has shown that recent changes in publisher preferences diminish the role of best effort caching services. Declining bandwidth costs further reduce their relevance. Thus, managers are better off directing their resources towards provisioning value-added services. This finding is also corroborated by recent articles in the business press (Mears 2002). Resources may be diverted towards serving the maximum number of data objects from the premium cache.
Services like Akamai's Edgesuite that enable delivery of entire sites from the edge caches, bundled with business intelligence and content targeting, may well become the norm. This is an indication of the impending metamorphosis of the content delivery value chain. That is, if L θ and H θ ever meet then they are always equal (market is exactly captured), thus ensuring that the two QICs never cross each other. The quality indifference curves are therefore always "well-behaved".
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 2
Let us assume that the converse is true. respectively. The number of objects requested R times is given by Nf(R).
Thus, these objects constitute a total of NRf(R) requests. The fraction of these requests that are for content in the best effort service is (R) )d f( The FOC indicates that if the IAP increases α infinitesimally, both the hit rate and subscrip tion to the best effort service goes up (first term), hit rate of the premium service decreases (second term), subscriptions to the premium service decreases (third term) but the per-object price for the iv premium service is increased by the IAP (fourth term). Although, the per-object price increases, it can be shown that the total price paid by any publisher decreases with α , as expected. (Brouwer 1910 ).
